TGCCC Notes of the Special Meeting 14 August 2006
Terminals GCCC
(Terminals Geelong Community Consultative Committee)
Notes of the Special Meeting
Emergency Management Procedures
Held at the CFA Corio Station
20-32 Birdwood Ave, Norlane
Monday 14 August 2006
Present:
|
Facilitator |
Bob Barry (CFA) |
|
Speakers |
Gary O'Sullivan (Terminals) |
|
|
David Fitzgerald (Shell Refinery) Mick De Witt |
|
|
Ian Beswicke (CFA) Colin Reid |
|
|
Phil Wilson (Police) |
|
|
Libby Davis (SES) |
|
|
Neil McKenzie (EPA) |
|
|
Andrew Forbes (Worksafe) |
|
|
Kevin Garde (CoGG) |
|
|
Ken Stanley (Toll Ports) |
|
|
Don Smith (Ambulance) |
|
Committee Members |
Robin Saunders (Chair) |
|
|
Katie Rafferty (Minute Taker) |
|
|
Sue McLean (Geelong Community for Good Life) Joe Cicero |
|
|
Carlo Fasolino (Terminals Pty Ltd) Geoff Millard Angelo Smarelli Karen Sherlock |
|
|
Peter Linaker (Community Representative) |
|
|
Franceska Desalak (Special Monitors of Geelong) |
|
|
Bill Aitken (Northern Community Consultative Group) |
|
|
Catherine Jones (Green Party) |
|
|
Sue Kelly-Turner (Geelong Community Forum) |
Apologies:
|
|
Ralph Taylor (Community Representative) |
|
Bob Barry |
With a PowerPoint Presentation stated the following: Aim of "Exercise Vapour" To exercise participants with the general responsibility for emergency management in line with Terminals, Shell & Port Emergency Management Plans To provide the TGCCC with an overview of Emergency Management Plans & Procedures Objectives To ensure that emergency management roles and responsibilities of Terminals, Shell & Port of Geelong are appropriate to deal with all emergencies; To test arrangements for Terminals preparedness for, response to and recovery from emergencies; To test the adequacy of the Terminals Emergency Plan and associated procedures, and; To provide the TGCCC with an overview of how emergencies are managed in the Terminals / Shell precinct. Rules of Engagement for the meeting Representatives of each of the ESO's and Agency participating will be asked to respond to specific questions TGCCC members will refrain from intervention &/or questions until their nominated break The facilitators may cut an answer short in the interests of exploring the scenario further "The umpires decision will be final and no correspondence will be entered into!" Reference Documents/PlansReference Documents/Plans The main document source: Terminals Emergency Management Plan Shell Emergency Management Plan Port of Geelong Emergency Management Plan Supporting document source: CoGG Emergency Plan R2D2 Emergency Plan Emergency Management Manual Victoria CFA Major Hazard Facility Plans |
|
CFA |
Responds to gas leaks, fires, hazardous chemical spills. |
|
EPA |
Provides a support role to Authorities, except where it takes control of pollution on water. |
|
Police |
Explained R2D2 as Region 2 Division 2, (the region includes the Terminals site) and follows a local plan. The police become the coordinator for the incident response. |
|
Port of Geelong |
Follow the Whole of Port Plan and the detailed plan for each facility. The group is part of the management of the plan. |
|
Shell |
Follows the major or minor crisis plan (including the jetty) and Shell EMP. |
|
SES |
Undertake flood, storm, natural disasters and support other agencies. |
|
GoGG |
The CoGG has its own plans for events. |
|
Ambulance |
Area 1 has disaster manuals for the Port, Shell and Terminals and a communication centre in Geelong. |
|
Worksafe |
Covers OHS, Dangerous goods legislation, administer and serve legislation. Can respond to a MHF incident within an hour. |
|
Terminals |
Site Emergency Management Plan |
|
Bob |
Set the scene for the general idea of the emergency scenario:
Today is Sunday August 27th. The time is 1000 hours. (worst case scenario) 4 Ships are berthed at Refinery Pier and Lascelles Wharf Unloading activities are underway at both Wharfs. Refinery pier has product being unloaded for Shell and Terminals Terminals are unloading VINYL CHLORIDE MONOMER (VCM) The weather is currently 12 degrees Celsius and predicted to reach a top of 17 degrees. The wind is currently South East at 5 - 10 Klm/hr. Minimal cloud cover with a sunny day predicted. |
|
Bob Barry |
Asked each speaker to detail Resources Immediately Available on such a day (at first and then by recall): ESO's - Police, Fire, Ambulance, VicSES Shell Terminals, CoGG Emergency Management personnel DHS WorkSafe & EPA Port - TOLL and VRCA Other Agencies present that would be involved in am emergency |
|
CFA |
4-5 people on duty, volunteers to be called in as required. 8 to 12 could respond within 20 minutes from three stations in the vicinity (Geelong City, Corio and Lara) with further people over time. Sunday is a day when volunteers would generally be widely available. |
|
Police |
16 police on duty, all crews on the road |
|
Ambulance |
6 crews plus duty manager, 6 on recall |
|
SES |
Duty officer may be in Geelong or Hamilton, 4(-6?) volunteer (units?) officers, plus 2 or 3 on recall |
|
Shell |
14 at immediate response then 10 more by recall |
|
Terminals |
4 onsite or berth conducting ship discharge |
|
CoGG |
1 duty officer, emergency management personnel by call back |
|
Worksafe |
1 person, 2-3 recall and a dozen over an hour. |
|
EPA |
1 immediately, another over two hours |
|
Port |
1 immediately, 12 in an hour, 40 in two hours |
|
Bob Barry |
Emergency Equipment Terminals - what emergency equipment and procedures are in place for the pier area? Shell Refinery - what emergency equipment and procedures are in place for the pier area? |
|
Terminals |
Utilise Shell's equipment and curtain spray |
|
Shell |
Wharves have overhead monitors, water and foam, fire-fighting facility with remote control from the back gate. |
|
Toll |
Fire fighting facilities on the ship. It is the Captain's responsibility for systems on ships. |
|
Bob Barry |
Showed photos that illustrate the pipes used when unloading VCM from the ship and gave the following details of Vinyl Chloride Monomer (VCM): Colourless Liquefied Gas with sweet ether-like odour. S7 Dangerous poison Extremely Flammable, Pool fires, Jet fires - pipework, flash fires. Burning will emit toxic fumes, Hydrogen Chloride, Phosgene, oxides of Carbon. Flammability Range 4 -33% (v/v) Flash Point -78 Degree Celsius Vapour cloud explosion, BLEVE, May cause cancer, carcinogen Freeze burns, direct skin contact Heavier than air RVD = 2.2 Detailed the following emergency scenario: A high-pressure discharge line splits during unloading. VCM is discharging onto the deck area. Pools of the product are producing large volume of gas & vapour. There is potential for a flash fire &/or vapour explosion No fire ensuing from the leak at this stage. |
|
Bob Barry |
Actions/Response/Approach Port Facility Operators - Terminals / Shell Who would be first to respond and from where? What would you expect to find? What initial actions would you take? What communications would take place - ships, Terminals, Shell Emergency Services Emergency Services arrive - Fire & Police What initial actions would you take? Who is in control? Where would initial control be established? Who's Emergency Plan would be enacted |
|
Terminals |
In the worst-case scenario, it may be 2-3 minutes before the line split is detected. There are two operators on the jetty and two ship crew on deck watch. 1. Terminals operator on the jetty would hit the emergency stop to the ship. 2. Both operators would evacuate the jetty and 3. hit the Terminal emergency shut off valve - 4. a 25/30 second closure time. The product is being pumped at 330 tonnes /hour, equivalent to 350 cubic metres/hour, giving some 3500 to 4000 litres spilt in 25 seconds. 5. Notify Shell, radio to Terminals, Emergency call out to the CFA then all operators would move to the Shell muster point on berth and advise Shell. All operations cease and the gas monitoring equipment (PID's) would come out. There would be radio communication with the ship and the ship would implement their action plan. This procedure is all documented, and preservation of life would take precedence over materials. |
|
Shell |
Would sound the minor alarm. The fire fighting system would be brought into service. Fire monitors would be turned on by remote control. Water would be sprayed to disperse the gas. The CFA would be notified and the back gates would be shut off - no entry. There would be radio and telephone communication to the ship. Would put the emergency plan into operation while getting further advice from Gary at Terminals, and keep on spraying with water. |
|
CFA (Colin, on duty) |
Follow standard operating procedures. Operators would get dressed, three trucks would be sent out. The aerial boom would be used for Terminals. Wind direction would be checked prior to leaving. While there would be no information on the incident at this stage, there is a Terminals folder in the pumper for staff to inspect. Vic fire through the CAD centre in the World Trade Centre would be in touch with CFA. |
|
Police |
Would ask safest approach route and where the forward command point was. |
|
CFA Control (Ian) |
The Emergency Management Act specifies who is in control (see also Part 6 of the Emergency Manual). The CFA is in control, and Control is established at the front gate of Terminals. Would follow Terminals Emergency Plan and Shell's EMP would also be followed. There would be a three-brigade response with trucks from Corio, Geelong City and Lara. The Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) Centre in Melbourne would have them linked together—communications and alarms. |
|
Bob Barry |
Situation/Community Would the community be aware of what is going on? Sirens / Emergency Services response. Are Terminals &/ or Shell engaging the community at this stage? What notification are the ESO's giving the community? Fire service together with Shell are dealing with on ground operations VRCA are dealing with other ships via radio Terminals & Shell undertaking emergency procedures Media is going ballistic |
|
Toll |
Would deal with other ships by radio along with Victorian Regional Channel Authority and Lascelles. |
|
|
The emergency services would not notify the community at this stage until information had been gained. The media would be listening to the Emergency Services radio transmissions and would be [OE]going ballistic". |
|
|
DISCUSSION BREAK |
|
|
The community reps formulated questions to be presented at a later stage—see separate document |
|
|
Scenario Part Two — the incident unfolds (generally this stage represents the second hour after the incident) |
|
Bob Barry |
Command/Control/Communication |
|
Terminals |
Said it would now be a large vapour leak with a toxic vapour cloud 340-400m from the source. (The main gate is 500m from the jetty.) . The concentration of VCM would be 1000ppm (not in the flammable range, which has a lower threshold of 36,000 ppm). A mist or fog would be visible over the water and since it was heavier than air is would be low. Discharge into the sea would boil off. The worst-case scenario would be that the cloud would be around the gatehouse. It might track up the channel. The vapour would have to be at 7000ppm for the gas alarms to go off. At the 1000 ppm concentration it could possibly be smelt. At the end of the jetty where it meets the terminal the vapour cloud may or may not rise over the 3m bank. |
|
Bob Barry |
Asked what would happened if there was some concentration at Shell? |
|
Gary |
Stated it would need to be a concentration of 36,000 ppm for the alarms to go off. |
|
Terminals |
There is monitoring equipment from Terminals and Shell. The CFA monitoring equipment (TMX) would be used to ascertain where the vapour cloud was. There is also counter terrorism monitoring equipment. |
|
Bob Barry |
Asked who is responsible for accounting for personnel on the wharf? |
|
Terminals |
Would be at the Gatehouse. Shell gate-house has a tally of two people on the wharf. |
|
CFA (Colin) |
Said he would liaise with Gary to make sure everyone was accounted for, and to see if anyone needed rescue. The police would be called for traffic control. The EPA would be contacted as the incident involved a spill. Terminals would notify Worksafe. The CFA regional duty officer would be on the scene. |
|
Bob Barry |
Asked where Control would be exercised from in this second hour into the incident. |
|
CFA |
Control would still be exercised from the front gate of Terminals. Would ask for the mobile communications van (MCV) to be brought in to compile an emergency management team. The team would combat the emergency at hand. The CFA, Police, SES, EPA and Worksafe agency commanders would represent them in the team. |
|
Bob Barry |
Asked where an Incident Control Centre & an Operations Point (FCP) would be established. |
|
CFA |
If the incident was likely to be prolonged, an incident control centre (ICC) would be set up at the regional control centre in Separation St. in the first 1-1.5 hours of the incident. All agencies would be there to look at the big picture. CFA doesn't move control until the ICC is up and running, and they formally take over control. |
|
Terminals |
As far as the VCM is concerned, what hit the deck would have flashed off as vapour and whatever hit the water would have boiled off. The vapour cloud may be at the back of the Shell Terminal. Some VCM would be coming out of the intact hose and people could now be sent in to isolate that, wearing gas masks. The gas would be dispersed closer to shore and at this stage there would not be a risk of flammability. |
|
Bob Barry |
Asked how the CFA would approach sending people in. |
|
CFA (Colin) |
Would use the Data Base to get information on VCM. (Would rely on data chem. Info from Vicfire regarding VCM?). Protective equipment required would be determined by this information. Breathing apparatus would be used but gas suit is not required. The PID (photo ionisation detector) would be used to measure the ppm of VCM. Crews would be briefed at appropriate locations. |
|
Bob Barry |
Asked where staging would be established? |
|
CFA (Ian) |
Near Terminals, the Shell fire station. |
|
Bob Barry |
Asked what notifications would be being made and by whom? |
|
Terminals |
WorkCover, CFA would tell EPA, Gary would tell his bosses (Carlo). |
|
Shell |
Would be under the Direct Management Team |
|
CFA |
Given the scenario, the community would be given minimal information (probably just that the incident was under control). Colin said he would tell his boss to keep him in the loop, so that the media could be briefed. |
|
|
In response to a question about Occupational Health and Safety, and a query from Don Smith about when he'd be advised, advice was provided that the ambulance would have been notified earlier in the piece and an ambulance would be on standby. |
|
Bob Barry |
Asked what EMP's would be being used? |
|
CFA (Ian) |
Terminals' and Shells' (Wharf? or EMP?) plans would be being used, and the CoGG's if the community is involved. |
|
COGG |
The Community Arrangements plan would be being used. |
|
Bob Barry |
Asked where coordination would take place? |
|
Police |
Role to co-ordinate resources to the Community Arrangements plan. They would be responsible for road closures and diversions. COGG and DHS would be notified by police to know what resources might be needed. |
|
Bob Barry |
Asked if a MECC would be established? |
|
COGG |
Would make recovery arrangements. The Recovery Manager would organise through DHS relief centres. The Municipal Emergency Communication Centre (MECC) would be set up in all probability and if an MECC was not set up, the CoGG MERO (Municipal Emergency Response Officer) would go to Separation Street (within 45 minutes). |
|
Bob Barry |
Asked what linkages there would be between Control and Coordination? |
|
CFA (Ian) |
Said they would be sitting side by side, and would have meetings with all the key players. |
|
Bob Barry |
Queried Traffic Management—what and by who? |
|
CFA (Colin) |
Going back to the initial phase: CFA would advise the police what CFA thought should be done. |
|
Terminals |
Would suggest isolating Port and School Roads and St Georges Road at the Salt Works as well as the Yacht Club road along the foreshore. |
|
Shell |
Shell could block the roads within 6-7 minutes. |
|
CFA (Ian) |
Said during the second hour they would consider what was unfolding, and there'd be close coordination between CFA and the Police ("joined at the hip"). |
|
Police |
Said they would look along the shore to see what's going on along the bay. Water Police and the Coast Guard would also be notified. |
|
|
In response to a question as to whether Toll would use a vessel to spray water, Ian advised that that was a call that would be made by CFA, and the answer would be probably not. |
|
Bob Barry |
Recovery arrangements - made to bring the community back to normality and may occur during the response stage of the emergency. |
|
Bob Barry |
Asked whether EMP's cover immediate recovery arrangements. |
|
CFA |
Stated their plans cover recovery. They can include counselling, relief centre and damage to the environment. Control centres should continue until recovery is in place. SES has a very big role in this. |
|
Bob Barry |
Asked what considerations would be being made regarding environmental damage and by who? Do EMP's cover environmental impact and damage control? |
|
EPA |
To consider the environmental damage. EMP's cover the environmental impact and damage control. |
|
CoGG |
Said the 2006 plan will have a section on the environment. The Harbour Master would be out on the water keeping in contact with the Water Police. (The Victorian Channel Authority has a new vessel in the harbour with fire fighting capability.) |
|
Bob Barry |
Evacuation/Community Warnings Evacuation Consideration by who? How will it occur? Where to? Evacuation from Ships? How and when by who? |
|
CFA |
We are the combating agency (Control Agency) and we'd do evacuation in cooperation with the Police. |
|
Terminals |
Would be evacuated on site under the CFA. |
|
Shell |
The southern end of Shell would be evacuated to the other end of the site. |
|
Toll |
Ship personnel would be advised to stay on the ships, to close down and seal up the vessel. Work on Lascelles Wharf would be stopped. |
|
Ambulance |
People on foot would be picked up by Emergency Services eg ambulance if exposed. An ambulance would be on standby at Norlane Station, forward command post and senior liaison at Separation Street. |
|
Bob Barry |
Community Warnings What warnings will be provided to the community and by whom? Who will approve this messaging? How will the messages be delivered to the community? Media - who will deal with the media and where? |
|
CFA (Ian) |
It's our responsibility and we'd do it through the police. Sometimes it's better to say nothing (to deter site see-ers). |
|
Police and general discussion |
Would co-ordinate community warnings, which would be broadcast through the media liaison office onto radio 774. Often there is no one in the radio studios, where broadcasts are automated from tape over the weekend. Local media can be organised with a phone call to the station manager but there would definitely be delayed information to the community. It is extremely difficult to get a message through to the local community. |
|
Terminals |
Stated there would be no need to notify the community in this scenario. |
|
CFA |
As far as the media are concerned, roadblocks would also control access by the media. A no fly zone for helicopters could be arranged if needed through the Police Air Wing via Air Traffic Control. |
|
Bob Barry |
Defusion/Debriefing After the successful combating of this incident what level of debriefing would occur? What level of record management would each agency undertake? |
|
CFA |
Process and decisions would be questioned. The incident controller would be questioned. Terminals would be involved in the debrief and a multi agency debrief would take place. Improvement cycles with the action plan would be made with recommendations. |
|
Police |
Mr Steve Barber (Divisional Chief) would get involved, multi agency involvement. |
|
CFA |
Each agency would do it internally first, and then all together, capturing what went well, and what didn't go so well. If there was a death involved, it would be very important to keep detailed records. The Coroner made 100 recommendations after the Linton fire. CFA disagreed with about 30 of them, and didn't implement those 30. |
|
Bob Barry |
Allowed questions from the community representatives. |
|
Joe Cicero |
Asked who makes decisions to stand down agencies? |
|
Bob Barry |
The incident controller is able to stand down agencies. |
|
Peter Linaker |
Asked who authorises evacuations, and return? |
|
CFA |
The chain of command goes from the Incident Controller to Agencies and then to the community. |
|
WorkSafe |
A full written report is needed before operation of the site is re-commenced. Where a MHF is involved, a review and revision of the Safety Case is also required before the plant can start back up. This acceptance of the revision of the Safety Case must be the subject of a notice (a written letter) from WorkSafe. |
|
Franceska Desalak |
Asked who has responsibility for people (and kids) who might be walking along the foreshore? |
|
Police |
Said if it was safe to send staff, they would do it. |
|
Joe Cicero |
Asked what access there is onto the pier by emergency vehicles? |
|
Shell |
Shell vehicles and CFA vehicles can access the pier. |
|
Sue McLean |
Asked how the CFA work out what vehicles are sent out? |
|
CFA (Colin) and general discussion |
The officer in charge decides. The initial response from Corio would be one pumper and one tele-boom appliance, and a supporting pumper would be sourced from Geelong City and Lara. If further information was received, the CFA would consider sending the hazardous materials unit (which has decontamination equipment on board). |
|
Katie Rafferty |
From personal experience, thanked CFA and the emergency services in general for their superb performance in the recent Anakie fires. |
|
Robin Saunders |
On behalf of the community members of the TGCCC, thanked the CFA and agencies present for an excellent and informative meeting. |
|
|
Meeting closed at 9.45pm. |

